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1 INTRODUCTION
In the course of time the position of the judiciary vis-à-vis the legislator has
gone through considerable changes.Well over two hundred years ago the court
was depicted as the mouth of the written law (la bouche de la loi).1 In modern
civil law its role has become more and more important. Nowadays the judi-
ciary can rather be portrayed as a partner to the legislator, each of them
playing a different role: the legislator provides the framework and the general
rules, the court ensures a just and proper application in the concrete cases
which are brought before it.
In the new Dutch Civil Code (DCC), enacted nearly twenty years ago,2 this
partnership is clearly visible. In various contexts the legislator equips the court
with the power to decide whether a certain juridical consequence shall or shall
not occur (‘The court may [...]’). Such a power to decide is stronger than the
standard power to assess, which a court has as a consequence of its task to
judge. The latter ‘power’, present throughout the judgment process, embodies
no more than a latitude. Especially with so-called open criteria, however, this
latitude can be substantial.
This essay serves to analyse (the power and) the role of the court,3 in
connection with that of the parties, when a change of circumstances occurs
that undermines an existing contract.4
Jaap Hijma is professor of Private Law, Leiden University (j.hijma@law.leidenuniv.nl).
1 Ch. de Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, Paris 1748.
2 The central Books 3, 5 and 6 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek were enacted 1 January 1992.
3 The essay comprises a continuation of some of the thoughts developed (in Dutch) in Jac.
Hijma,Het constitutieve wijzigingsvonnis, inaugural lecture Leiden, Deventer: Kluwer 1989;
Jac. Hijma, Imprévision, in: M.E. Franke c.s. (eds.), Europees contractenrecht, BW-krant Jaarboek,
Deventer: Kluwer 1995, pp. 57-69.
4 The consequences of unforeseen circumstances are the subject of some interesting comparat-
ive law studies published recently: E. Hondius & H.C. Grigoleit (eds.), Unexpected Circum-
stances in European Contract Law, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press 2011; R.Momberg
Uribe, The effect of a change of circumstances on the binding force of contracts, diss. Utrecht,
Intersentia 2011.
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2 REASONABLENESS AND FAIRNESS; UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES
The judicial ‘power’ to assess reaches its zenith in article 6:248 DCC, which
establishes a dual effect of reasonableness and fairness (i.e. the unwritten law
between a debtor and a creditor). In the first place reasonableness and fairness,
like the law or usages, bring a useful tool to fill the gaps the parties left in
their contract. In the second place reasonableness and fairness are endowed
with a derogating power. The overall character of the latter demonstrates the
paramount character of reasonableness and fairness under the Dutch law of
obligations.5
Article 6:248 DCC6
1. A contract not only has the juridical effects agreed to by the parties, but also
those which, according to the nature of the contract, apply by virtue of law, usage
or the requirements of reasonableness and fairness.
2. A rule binding upon the parties as a result of the contract does not apply to the
extent that, in the given circumstances, this would be unacceptable according to
standards of reasonableness and fairness.
Reasonableness and fairness produce their effects ipso iure, without the inter-
vention of a court.
Various Civil Code provisions contain elaborations of this general concept
of reasonableness and fairness. Among them is article 6:258 DCC, governing
the occurrence of unforeseen circumstances.7
Article 6:258 DCC
1. Upon the demand of one of the parties, the court may modify the effects of a
contract or it may set it aside, in whole or in part, on the basis of unforeseen
circumstances of such a nature that the other party, according to standards of
reasonableness and fairness, may not expect the contract to be maintained in
unmodified form. The modification or setting aside may be given retroactive effect.
2. The modification or the setting aside shall not be pronounced to the extent that
it is common ground that the person invoking the circumstances should be account-
able for them or if it follows from the nature of the contract.
3. For the purposes of this article, a party to whom a contractual right or obligation
has been transmitted, is treated as a contracting party.
5 Likewise art. 6:2 DCC regarding all (so also non-contractual) obligations.
6 When citing Dutch Civil Code provisions I adopt the English translation by H.Warendorf,
R. Thomas and I. Curry-Sumner, The Civil Code of the Netherlands, Alphen aan den Rijn:
Kluwer Law International 2009.
7 A concise commentary on this Dutch article is provided by W. Wiggers, in: Hondius &
Grigoleit 2011, pp. 70-76. For a comparison with article 6:111 PECL see D. Busch, in: Busch
c.s. (eds.), The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law, Nijmegen & The Hague/
London/New York: Ars Aequi Libri & Kluwer Law International 2002, p. 285-289. In the
Dutch language see inter alia E. Baan &W.L. Valk, in: E.H. Hondius & R.J.Q. Klomp (eds.),
Verbintenissenrecht, loose-leaf, Deventer: Kluwer, Art. 258.
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At least two aspects catch the eye. Firstly that the occurrence of unforeseen
circumstances is governed by the standards of reasonableness and fairness,
mentioned already in article 6:248 DCC. Secondly that with regard to unforeseen
circumstances reasonableness and fairness do not produce their effect ipso iure:
it is the court itself which, by means of its decision, modifies the effects of
the contract or sets the contract aside.
3 RATIO OF COURT INTERVENTION
Why did the Dutch legislator devote a separate provision to the appearance
of unforeseen circumstances, instead of leaving the subject simply to the
general regime of reasonableness and fairness? The question arises the more
because the Minister of Justice of that time observed that it would be possible
to reach a comparable result by means of the derogating effect of reasonable-
ness and fairness, if necessary combined with their supplementary effect.8
Indeed it is plausible that an interplay of derogation and supplementation
within the frame of article 6:248 DCC can lead to any thinkable result.
As the parliamentary history shows, the predominant reason for adding
article 6:258 DCC was that for determining the consequences of unforeseen
circumstances the legislator prefers a constitutive court decision to the ipso
iure effect of article 6:248 DCC. The difference is considered appropriate because
changed circumstances lead to a definitive new arrangement of the contractual
relations. This implies a deep intervention; moreover, many cases will be rather
complex so that various solutions are possible.9 So it is for reasons of legal
certainty that the legislator here prefers a constitutive court verdict to a declar-
ative one.
4 DISCRETIONARY POWER?
Article 6:258 DCC requires ‘unforeseen circumstances of such a nature that the
other party, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, may not
expect the contract to be maintained in unmodified form’. This formula not
onlymakes up a threshold for a court intervention, but simultaneously contains
the standards which govern such an intervention. As a result the powers of
the court are limited.
In the first place, both the Dutch legislator and the Dutch Supreme Court
emphasize that the judiciary shall adopt a reserved attitude towards the
alteration or termination of contracts. Reasonableness and fairness demand
8 Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek, Boek 6, Deventer: Kluwer 1981,
p. 973.
9 Ibid., p. 974.
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first and foremost that the parties are bound according to the contract they
concluded; therefore the requirements of article 6:258 DCC will only (very)
rarely be met.10 In the second place, if according to reasonableness and fair-
ness a party may not expect the contract to be maintained unmodified, the
court will be obliged to modify or terminate the contract.11 The expression
‘the court may’ does not imply a real discretionary power, in the sense that
courts would be free to dismiss the demand wilfully or to push forward their
personal views. It actually indicates the possibility of an adaptation or setting
aside in the specific way of a court decision. In this view the emphasis is not
on the word ‘may’, but on ‘the court’: the court may adapt the contract or set
it aside, by means of a constitutive verdict.
5 CONTRACT MODIFICATION; AN ILLUSTRATION
In this essay I will concentrate on the option of a modification of (the effects
of) the contract. A case study may illustrate that in view of changed circum-
stances this can be an attractive solution.12
KBB, a chain store business, concludes a development contract with the
municipality of Utrecht: Utrecht will (in due time) provide a site ready for
building, KBBwill establish an ambitious Bijenkorf store there. The preparation
of the building site takes a number of years. After completion KBB remains
inert. When the municipality demands the building of the store, KBB argues
that in view of the dramatically changed circumstances it cannot demand
performance. In the years that passed the population of Utrecht grew less than
expected, the purchasing power generally declined, the public with greater
purchasing power left the city, and a number of competing shopping malls
were established. In the present circumstances the fulfilment of the large-scale
plan will prove highly loss-making for KBB. The municipality takes the view
that such difficulties belong to the normal risks of entrepreneurship, adding
– hardly delicately – that this holds true even if it would result in the downfall
of the entrepreneur.
The District Court rules that KBB is bound by the contract (pacta sunt
servanda). The Court of Appeal, however, holds the opinion that the city,
according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, may not demand the
contract to be fulfilled unmodified. The Court holds that the fact that the city
cannot demand performance of the original contract does not imply that it
can demand nothing at all. The contract obliges KBB to investigate other possib-
10 Ibid., p. 969; Dutch Supreme Court 20 February 1998,NJ 1998, 493 (Briljant Schreuders/ABP).
11 Provided one of the parties so demands; see infra, nr. 6.
12 The case was decided by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (Hof Amsterdam 6 May 1982,
nr. 314/81). Its decision was not published as such, but is cited extensively by P. Abas,
Rebus sic stantibus, Deventer: Kluwer 1989, pp. 202-205.
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ilities and varieties of performance, to serve the contract in a new way that
is meaningful for both parties. Eventually the Court directs an appearance
of the parties, to research in what way KBB can still be held to deliver a per-
formance.
A few years afterwards a more modest Utrecht Bijenkorf store is festively
opened.13
6 ‘UPON THE DEMAND OF ONE OF THE PARTIES’
The Bijenkorf case arose when the former Dutch Civil Code, enacted in 1838,14
was still in force. An adaptation of the contract by the court was not a valid
option then. Under the operation of the present Code, article 6:258 DCC enables
the court to adapt the contract itself. According to this article the court is only
entitled to do so ‘upon the demand of one of the parties’. So either KBB, or
the city of Utrecht is needed to activate the judicial power. Such a party
demand can take various forms, both formally and materially. As far as the
contents are concerned, it can range from very abstract on the one hand (e.g.
‘such an adaptation of the obligations as the court will seem fit’) to very
concrete on the other hand (e.g. ‘a price reduction of C= 1000’).
Concrete demands
Let us start with the more concrete demands. Suppose that, in the above-
mentioned case, KBB agreed with Utrecht to establish a three-storey Bijenkorf
(a luxury store). Circumstances deteriorate seriously. Utrecht requires perform-
ance of the contract as it is, but KBB demands (a termination or) an adaptation
by the court, thus that KBB will be obliged to establish the three storey-store
not of the Bijenkorf formula but instead of the less glamorous HEMA formula,
which aims at a lower market segment and consequently holds much better
prospects. The court ponders on the various solutions. Eventually it reaches
the conclusion that in this case the establishment of a smaller, two-storey,
Bijenkorf store would be the adequate result. The court attempts to lead the
parties in this direction, but they stick to their views. So three opinions com-
pete: that of the municipality (a three-storey Bijenkorf), that of KBB (a three
storey HEMA) and that of the judging court (a two-storey Bijenkorf).15 From
here on, different ways of reasoning can be followed.
Some will argue that every demand as meant in article 6:258 DCC puts the
matter completely into the hands of the court, thus that the court – once it
is activated by the party demand – can freely pursue its own point of view.
13 NRC Handelsblad 26 November 1984 (mentioned by Abas 1989, p. 205).
14 This former Dutch Civil Code was largely derived from the French Code civil (1804).
15 For reasons of lucidity these alternatives are rather stylized.
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In my opinion this argument pays too little tribute to the fact that the phrase
‘upon the demand of one of the parties’ principally serves to make the court
dependent on the party views which are presented to it. The party demand
does not only trigger the court decision, but simultaneously confines it. To
that extent the court is obliged to turn to the solutions mentioned by the
parties.16 But how shall it treat these?
The first option is, that the court will reject any demand which does not
(sufficiently) indicate the outcome it considers best. Thus the risk rests with
the party refusing to fulfil the contract, in casu KBB. If this party fails to suggest
the ‘right’ solution (i.e. the solution the court thinks fit), its demand for adapta-
tion of the contract will be denied; as a result it will have to perform the
contract as promised.
The second option is, that from the various solutions which the parties
bring up the court will choose the one that, in its opinion, comes closest to what
the parties are entitled to expect from one another according to reasonableness
and fairness. If the establishment of a HEMA store qualifies as more than an
unmodified contract fulfilment, the court will choose that relatively best
solution, even though it is convinced that a third solution (a smaller Bijenkorf
store), which is not brought up by one of the parties, would be preferable.
The raising of a better alternative by party A thus shifts the risk to party B,
in the sense that A’s suggestion will prevail unless B provides the court with
an even better proposition.
I recommend the second approach. Principally a second-best result is to
be preferred to the (possibly) worst outcome. Moreover: in the first system
one party can sit back and hope the other party proposes a ‘wrong’ solution
that is rejected by the court, as a result of which the other party stays bound
to fulfil the contract as it is. In the second system the party who is confronted
by a better demand, is urged to show its cards and produce an even more
suitable alternative.
General demands
When a party brings up an adaptation request of a more general nature, the
situation will not be as delicate. Suppose KBB demands its obligations to be
reduced to the establishment of ‘a considerably smaller department store’, or
simply demands a reduction of its obligations, leaving the elaboration to the
sound insight of the court. This kind of demand provides the court with every
opportunity to reach the result that, in its opinion, is dictated primarily by
reasonableness and fairness (i.e. the smaller Bijenkorf store). If a party feels
16 A similar opinion is given by M. Mekki & M. Kloepfer-Pelèse, Hardship and Modification
(or ‘Revision’) of the Contract, in: A.S. Hartkamp c.s. (eds.), Towards a European Civil Code,
Alphen aan den Rijn & Nijmegen: Kluwer Law International & Ars Aequi Libri 2011, p.
679.
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insecure about the outcome it prefers, it will be wise to formulate a subsidiary
demand in general terms.
7 COMPLEMENTARY ROLE OF ARTICLE 6:248 DCC
Does the general article 6:248 DCC (reasonableness and fairness)17 play a role
in cases of unforeseen circumstances? The fact that article 6:258 DCC was
created to put these matters into the hands of the court18 points to a negative
answer. Where a more specific article exists, the general article will withdraw
(lex specialis derogat legi generali). Moreover, if reasonableness and fairness still
have their effect ipso iure, the constitutive judicial verdict referred to in article
6:258 DCC becomes an oddity. The conclusion that the court on the one hand
is dependent on a party demand (art. 6:258 DCC), but on the other hand can
simply observe modifications by reasonableness and fairness (art. 6:248 DCC),
is contradictory.
These observations do not implicate that there is no place at all for article
6:248 DCC in cases of changed circumstances. Let us return to the Bijenkorf
case. Unforeseen circumstances have occurred implying that the city may not
expect the contract to be maintained unmodified. But what is the city entitled
to expect then? As discussed above, various results are possible; it will not
be easy to determinewhich of these is ‘the perfect option’. The court considers
a reduced Bijenkorf store the best solution. If reasonableness and fairness
automatically modified the contract in that way, KBB would not realize that
it is obliged to establish that smaller store, and the city would not realize that
it can demand that (and only that) performance. Such an ‘invisible’ outcome
is neither attractive nor reasonable and fair.
A different approach seems preferable: what the parties are entitled to
expect from one another is that they strive, in consultation, for a mutually
acceptable solution. The parties may expect that the contract is put on the table
to exchange the old certainty for a new certainty. The party seeking perform-
ance of the original contract has the advantage. The law will honour its claim
until the other party – needing adaptation – has taken a proper initiative. In
view of articles 6:248 and 6:258 DCC the pursuit of performance must be
unacceptable. This severe demand will only be met if the other party does not
simply refuse performance but takes a constructive attitude.19 If the other
party shows insufficient initiative, the first party is entitled to pursue the
contract in unmodified form. This effect of article 6:248 DCC is not blocked by
article 6:258 DCC. On the contrary, interpreted like this, the articles are comple-
mentary and constitute a coherent system.
17 Cited supra, nr. 2.
18 See supra, nr. 3.
19 With the exception of cases in which a termination of the contract is the obvious solution.
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In view of these considerations article 6:258 DCC does not, as a lex specialis,
push article 6:248 (2) DCC aside. It is no lex specialis, but rather a lex suppleta,
indicating that – next to the parties themselves – the court too has the power
to modify the contract or to set the contract aside. Such a dual system, consist-
ing of an extrajudicial and a judicial component, is not uncommon under Dutch
law.20
8 OBLIGATIONS AND OBLIEGENHEITEN; PRINCIPLES
In the system depicted the duties of both parties to reconsider the contract
do not have the character of real obligations. They are duties of a lower grade,
usually labelled Obliegenheiten: if a party does not comply, this does not
constitute a failure and the party will not be liable because of nonperformance.
The sanction is more subtle: reasonableness and fairness prevent the (first)
party from invoking the unforeseen circumstances so that it stays obliged to
perform the contract as it is, respectively reasonableness and fairness prevent
the (second) party from invoking the original contract so that it cannot demand
its fulfilment.
Some other legal systems establish real obligations to (re)negotiate when
unforeseen circumstances occur. A prominent example lies in the Principles
of European Contract Law (PECL).
Article 6:111 PECL
Change of circumstances
[...]. If, however, performance of the contract becomes excessively onerous because
of a change of circumstances, the parties are bound to enter into negotiations with
a view to adapting the contract or ending it [...]. If the parties fail to reach agree-
ment within a reasonable period, the court may: [...] award damages for the loss
suffered through a party refusing to negotiate or breaking off negotiations contrary
to good faith and fair dealing.
The recently published Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) shows a
more restrained approach.
Article III.-1:110 DCFR
Variation or termination by court on a change of circumstances
[...] Paragraph (2) applies only if: [...] the debtor has attempted, reasonably and
in good faith, to achieve by negotiation a reasonable and equitable adjustment of
the terms regulating the obligation.
20 Cf. art. 3:49 DCC (annulment), art. 3:54 DCC (modification in case of undue influence),
art. 6:230 DCC (modification in case of mistake) and art. 6:267 DCC (setting aside because
of nonperformance).
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The accompanying commentarymentions that the solution chosen in the PECL
is criticized as ‘undesirably complicated and heavy’. The DCFR takes account
of these criticisms by not imposing an obligation to renegotiate on the parties,
butmaking it a requirement for a remedy that the debtor attempted to achieve
a proper adjustment of the contract. ‘There is no question of anyone being
forced to negotiate or being held liable in damages for failing to negotiate’,
the commentary stresses.21
The authors of the DCFR also refer to the UNIDROIT Principles of Intern-
ational Commercial Contracts (PICC), which in their opinion ‘adopt a similar
basic approach but use a slightly different drafting technique’.22 This estima-
tion seems questionable. The PICC-provision reads:
Article 6.2.3 PICC
Effects of hardship
In case of hardship the disadvantaged party is entitled to request renegotiations.
[...].
The phrase ‘entitled to request’ suggests an obligation, which can give rise
to claims for performance and damages because of nonperformance.23 In this
interpretation (this part of) the PICC regime is closer to that of the PECL than
to that of the DCFR.
It is interesting to learn that the youngest principle-like project, the Feasibil-
ity Study of the Expert Group on European Contract Law, sticks to the exist-
ence of obligations.24
Article 92 Feasibility Study
Change of circumstances
[...] If, however, performance becomes excessively onerous because of an exceptional
change of circumstances [...], the parties have a duty to enter into negotiations in
accordancewith good faith and fair dealingwith a view to adapting or terminating
the contract. Subject to [..], the court may award damages for the loss suffered
21 Chr. von Bar & E. Clive (eds.), Principles, Definitions andModel Rules of European Private Law,
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), Munich: Sellier 2009, Volume I, Art. III.-1:110,
Comments, C.
22 Von Bar & Clive 2009, ibid.
23 E.McKendrick, in: S. Vogenauer& J. Kleinheisterkamp (eds.),Commentary on theUNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009,
Art. 6.2.3, sub 1, notes that there is no express obligation imposed, but adds that it must
be borne in mind that the PICC contain a general principle of good faith (art. 1.7) and that
the parties are subject to a duty to co-operate (art. 5.1.3). Cf. UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts, Rome: UNIDROIT 2010, Art. 6.2.3, Comments, 5. See
also ibid., Comments, 2, mentioning the disadvantaged party’s ‘right to request renegoti-
ations’.
24 Commission Expert Group on European Contract Law, Feasibility Study for a future instrument
in European Contract Law, 3 May 2011, published on the Internet: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
contract/files/feasibility-study_en.pdf (Annex IV).
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through a party refusing to negotiate or breaking off negotiations contrary to good
faith and fair dealing.
However, the Expert Group is not sure of the suggested system. Article 92
is one of seven issues on which it seeks the advice of ‘all interested parties’:25
‘Article 92 foresees an exceptional possibility to alter a contract due to change of
circumstances. [...]. Do you think that the procedure which leads to the alteration
of a contract is appropriate?’26
9 REAL OBLIGATIONS TO NEGOTIATE?
In my opinion the creation of obligations to renegotiate is not necessary and
may therefore, in the words of the DCFR commentary, be labelled ‘undesirably
complicated and heavy’. What such obligations add to the more reserved
model of Obliegenheiten is the possibility for the other party to demand per-
formance (negotiations in good faith) or to claim damages because of non-
performance (frustration of negotiations). Neither of these options is really
useful. We should bear in mind that the parties concluded a contract which
is still on the table. The sanction that a party who refuses to negotiate ‘only’
forfeits the opportunity to refuse performance (debtor) respectively forfeits
its right to demand performance (creditor), has the fundamental advantage
that it focuses on the heart of the matter: the contract itself. Renegotiation
issues have a derived character, which is reflected accurately and attractively
by the technique of Obliegenheiten.
The creation of obligations is not necessary to protect the parties from
damage caused by unwillingness. This again follows from the fact that the
heart of the matter is the contract itself. If a party frustrates desirable
renegotiations, the court will be inclined to alter the contract not ex nunc but
from an earlier date, namely the date on which reasonable parties would
presumably have concluded their negotiations. The Dutch Code mentions
explicitly that themodification or setting asidemay be given retroactive effect
(article 6:258 (1) DCC).27 Such an automatic compensation in natura makes
more sense than an isolated financial compensation of the damage resulting
25 Feasibility Study, Introductory remarks, sub V (3).
26 After the completion of this essay, the Feasibility Study was succeeded by the Proposal
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European
Sales Law (CESL) d.d. 11 October 2011, COM(2011) 635 final. The proposed art. 89 (1) CESL
reads: ‘[...] Where performance becomes excessively onerous because of an exceptional
change of circumstances, the parties have a duty to enter into negotiations with a view
to adapting or terminating the contract’. This article does not mention damages because
of noncompliance.
27 Moreover, the court may pronounce a contract modification subject to conditions (e.g.
compensation); art. 6:260 (1) DCC.
Jaap Hijma 27
from not renegotiating in good faith. The possibility that the court thus ‘over-
takes’ a reluctant party creates a welcome pressure: it may be wiser to take
part in the negotiations, and thereby retain influence, than to withdraw and
leave the matter to the insight of the court.
10 CONCLUSION
All in all the Dutch regime regarding the modification of a contract with
respect to unforeseen circumstances amounts to an interplay of the parties
and the court.
The Code seems to equip the judiciary with great powers: the court may
modify the contract or may set it aside, in whole or in part. In essence the
court’s power is limited. The requirements for an intervention are rarely
fulfilled; moreover, the court is only entitled to intervene upon a party
demand, which fundamentally restricts its options. The parties themselves
will be wise to declare and effectuate their willingness to renegotiate. A debtor
who is not prepared to negotiate will forfeit a possible intervention by the
court; a creditor who is not prepared to negotiate will forfeit his right to claim
performance. This mechanism of mutualObliegenheiten is proper and generally
sufficient; there is no need to upgrade to structural obligations for the parties
to renegotiate.

